By Dr Christa N. Brunnschweiler
Why do revolutions happen in some countries and not in others? Are more economically backward countries more conflict-prone? In a recently published article[1] with Päivi Lujala (NTNU and University of Oulu), we address these questions by looking at how economic backwardness has affected the likelihood of mass movements for political regime change, from peaceful demonstrations to civil wars. We find that, indeed, the greater the development gap with the world economic leader, the more likely a country has experienced nonviolent and violent mass demonstrations for regime change and secession, and, to a lesser degree, armed civil conflict. Moreover, the relationship has been strengthening in recent decades. We also show that backwardness causes social unrest, and not vice versa. Our results may serve as a warning to governments that missed opportunities for economic development will come at the price of mounting social tension and unrest.
We believe this is due to a combination of two factors. First, people compare their economic status with that of the people they see around them. Traditionally, the latter were your neighbours and co-nationals, and you sought to emulate them in behaviour known as “keeping up with the Joneses”.[2] More recently, however, globalisation and the spread of digital media have made international comparisons simpler and more common.[3]
The second factor regards the ease of catching up with those who are better off: political ineptitude, or the outright suppression by government of activities that might threaten the position of the ruling elite, can make it difficult to emerge from economic backwardness. Put the two factors together, and you might get a dangerous build-up of popular discontent that can erupt into various forms of social tension.
Uncovering this new link between economic backwardness and civil unrest is very interesting, but the crucial question that besets much empirical work on the origins of conflict is whether a relationship is causal. We are able to answer this question by using novel instruments for economic backwardness that allow us to isolate the causal effect. We gathered data on mailing times and telegram charges around 1900 and argue that these are strongly linked to economic backwardness not only at the start of the 20th century, but even today.
The causal impact that we find is substantial (keep in mind that the likelihood of a country ever seeing any form of civil unrest is very low). For example, Mexico, which has experienced a series of mainly nonviolent, mass political protests, has had an average economic backwardness score. Had it been less backward – say on par with Israel or Singapore – its probability of seeing nonviolent protests would have been over 2 percentage points lower, and 5.6 percentage points lower if it had been as developed as its northern neighbour, the U.S.! In South Africa, the richest country in Sub-Saharan Africa, the anti-Apartheid movement of the 1980s often turned violent. Had South Africa been as developed as Spain at the time, it would have been 3.5 percentage points less likely to experience violent social conflict.
Our findings imply that economic development is not only desirable for its own sake, but also because a widening gap between development leaders and laggards poses serious risks for peace and internal stability in the countries left behind. The sceptic could object that results based on cross-country historical averages are unlikely to relate to the real-world problems of today. To answer this, let me conclude by saying that after we published our article as a working paper (the usual procedure for academic economists), I gave interviews to journalists from two different countries – Brazil and Iran. At the time, both countries were seeing widespread protests ascribed at least in part to economic backwardness. It just goes to show that every now and then, economists can provide some insight into what is going on around us.
[1] Brunnschweiler, C. N. and P. Lujala (2019), Economic Backwardness and Social Tension, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 121(2), 482–516.
[2] This behaviour was first described by T. Veblen (1899), The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, Allen and Unwin, London.
[3] Valente, S. (2009), International Status Seeking, Trade, and Growth Leadership, Canadian Journal of Economics 42, 554–589.