Hocus Pocus? The Economic Spell of Witchcraft

“The Discoverer never travelled far for it, but in March 1644 he had some seven or eight of that horrible sect of Witches living in the Towne where he lived, a Towne in Essex called Maningtree” Matthew Hopkins (1620 – 1647), Witch-Finder General.

Halloween. I’ve accomplished the unforgivable, I’ve forgotten to lock the gate. The hordes subsequently run riot. I’m accosted by three witches, two vampires and a zombie. I’m sympathetic to the zombie, deciding to give her my prized toffee apple. I can’t help but question the witches; have they seen Matthew Hopkins in their treat run? Devoid of local history knowledge, and unaware of the man responsible for the execution of 300 alleged witches in the 17th century, they’re non-plussed and just grab the sweets and bolt. In the settling dust, I’m left considering my botched attempt at humour: The Economics of the Witch-Finder General.

Witchcraft isn’t necessarily a topic befitting mirth. Gershman (2016), for example, refers to how witchcraft beliefs are found to erode social capital and therefore dangerously foster mistrust. Other than the murder that these attitudes can horrifically encourage, it harms economic development by destroying economic opportunity. However, at least for an East Anglian, Halloween witchcraft does tend to spark off a historical cackle. The local press kindly celebrates it each year with stories over the ‘most haunted’ locations. The exploits of Matthew Hopkins, Witch-Finder General, are guaranteed to make the list. Buried at Mistley Heath, a location which scared the socks off my dad as a child, his spectre is notably time efficient. It haunts the village pond, the location of many of his witch trials. That’s not enough ghost boo mind you. It also haunts various Essex drinking establishments: Mistley Thorn Hotel, The White Hart Inn and The Red Lion. I’m informed its particularly partial to cheese. It must be a ghoul staple.

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There is an economic question here mind you. Does economic analysis provide an explanation for Hopkin’s reign of witch finding terror? A discipline which is only focused on supply and demand would struggle. Fortunately, Economics is much more than that. It is therefore of little surprise that it can offer several. Here are some snippets:

  1. Political Economic Competition

Let’s start with the witch research provided by Leeson and Russ (2018). They compare witch trials to a two-party electoral contest. In such political brawl, the competitive edge rests on attracting the ‘undecided voter’. The Reformation, it is argued, creates the same conditions within a ‘religious’ market contest. Protestant and Catholic churches scramble for the ‘undecided believers’. Witch trials provide a useful boost. Advertising the ability to protect folk from Satan’s ill will, they provide a product to help determine church choice.

  1. Poverty and Aggregate Demand

The Macroeconomist of course cannot be side-lined. An alternative perspective is offered by the consequence of economic recession, as highlighted by Oster (2004). For this perspective, the success of the agricultural industry is key. Deteriorating weather conditions that hinder crop production will provoke an economic downturn. Witchcraft accusation is then a negative spill-over. It is horrendous scapegoating in an environment powder dry and ripe for an explosion in violence. Such arguments continue to hold favour in the literature. Miguel (2005), for example, links weather and income shocks to the murder of accused witch in Tanzania.

  1. Conflict and Rent Seeking

Hopkins took up his title Witch-Finder General in 1645. Could this development had been enabled by the English Civil Wars between 1642 and 1649? Conflict, by generating chaos, is also conducive to the creation of profiteering opportunity. Was Hopkins, a relatively impoverished lawyer, attracted to destroying the ‘works of the devil’ out of pecuniary interest? Records show, for his witch trial services, he made £23 in Stowmarket and £6 in Aldeburgh. Aggregating the rewards, he may have secured £1000. That sounds small fry. However, converting it into 2017 terms, it is actually a figure that exceeds £100,000. That would be enough for Hopkins to buy 156 horses. It represents 40 years of wages secured by a skilled tradesman. A hefty length of time in an era where average life expectancy was only approximately 35.

  1. Feminist Economics

Perhaps we can just return to The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Feminist? It is striking that, so far, we haven’t referred to any of the characteristics of Hopkin’s victims. Timbers (2008) allows us to remove this error. In Manningtree, those victims refer to “a small group of marginal women [who] formed their own community”. Perhaps we have patriarchy fighting to maintain this particularly vicious social order? Widows and single women become collateral damage, as society reinforces the dominance of male attitudes.

Which one is correct? I really couldn’t say. It is likely that all carry some weight. But what have we learnt from our excursion to Halloween witchery? Is it just a warning to stay away from Mistley Heath on Halloween night? Of course not. We have illustrated, via the Witch-Finder General, the breadth of topic which Economics can entertain. And, even more importantly, we have shown the integral importance of economic history. It is an importance that undoubtedly continues today in our pursuit of understanding of our current problems. Brexit excluded.

 

References

Gershman, B. (2016). Witchcraft beliefs and the erosion of social capital: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond, Journal of Development Economics, 120: 182-208.

Leeson, P.T. and Russ, J.W. (2018). Witch Trials, The Economic Journal, 128(613): 2066-2105.

Miguel, E. (2005). Poverty and Witch Killing, The Review of Economic Studies, 72(4): 1153–1172.

Oster, E. (2004). Witchcraft, Weather and Economic Growth in Renaissance Europe, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(1): 215-228.

Timbers, F. (2008). Witches’ Sect or Prayer Meeting?: Matthew Hopkins revisited, Women’s History Review, 17(1): 21-37.

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